Managing risks in Internationalisation: Security related issues by unknown
Managing risks in internationalisation 1
MANAGING RISKS IN  
INTERNATIONALISATION: 
SECURITY RELATED  
ISSUES 
Managing risks in internationalisation 2
CONTENTS
Key definitions 3
Foreword 4
Summary 6
Overview  10
1: Protecting your reputation and values 13
 1.1: Building resilience to security-related issues 14
 1.2: Due diligence 18
 1.3: Promoting the values of UK higher education 23
2: Protecting your people 27
 2.1: Internal and external communications and knowledge-sharing 28
 2.2: Protecting staff and students travelling and working overseas 31
3: Protecting your campuses 34
 3.1: Cybersecurity, estates and visitors 35
4: Protecting your partnerships 40
 4.1: Research security, intellectual property and export control compliance  41
 4.2: Transnational education partnerships 44
Forward look  48
Glossary 49
Annex 1: Summary of resources available to institutions 51
Annex 2: Guiding questions for cybersecurity, estates and visitor policies 55
Annex 3: Checklists for research security, intellectual property and export controls 56
References 58
Managing risks in internationalisation 3
KEY DEFINITIONS
internationalisation: the term ‘internationalisation’, as applied to higher education,  
is broad. In the context of these guidelines, internationalisation describes the  
purposeful integration of international and intercultural dimensions into aspects  
of university activity.1
security-related issues: the term ‘security-related’ is an umbrella term that describes 
a broad range of issues and risks that are associated with internationalisation. The 
security-related risks referred to in these guidelines can be broadly grouped into 
two categories: attempts by overseas/hostile/external actors or those acting on their 
behalf to illegitimately acquire academic research and expertise; and/or interfere with 
academic discourse. Universities must manage security-related issues and risks. If left 
unmanaged, these risks may impact reputation and values; people; campuses; and 
education and research partnerships of the UK HE sector.
Other significant terms are described in the Glossary.
1 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-20877-0_5
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FOREWORD
Professor Sir Peter Gregson and Professor Anthony Finkelstein
Internationalisation has shaped the agenda and strategies of universities not just in the 
UK, but globally. It has brought significant economic and social benefits to the UK, and 
intellectual opportunities for scholarship, while transforming universities into global 
institutions. The UK benefits from international research collaborations. Collaborations 
with international partners continue to be vital to the continued success of the UK’s 
research and innovation sector. The UK’s universities are world-leading, but they do not 
have a monopoly on brilliant researchers, and the UK benefits from the skills and expertise 
of researchers based at research organisations overseas.
The sector has historically done a good job of managing the risks associated with 
internationalisation. However, the risks are increasingly dynamic and growing in 
complexity. In this context, institutions will need to review and adapt their risk 
management processes. 
These guidelines are intended to support universities, enabling them to protect themselves, 
their staff and students, and to manage risks associated with internationalisation, amid 
intensified international strategic competition, political polarisation and backlash against 
globalisation. These risks, as outlined below and throughout this document, are faced by all 
universities, and every university should have a plan in place to protect the society of which 
it is a part, its reputation and its values, people, campuses and partnerships. 
The guidelines are designed to provide the governing body and the executive head of the 
university with the tools and the support needed to manage these risks. The university 
should necessarily draw on academic and professional expertise; however, accountability 
rests with the governing body and the executive head of the institution.
Although this is the first time Universities UK (UUK) has produced guidelines on this 
subject, the risks described here are not a new phenomenon. Universities are not starting 
from a zero base and have developed governance and risk management processes in place 
to protect individuals, institutions, and the sector. What has changed is the dynamism of 
the threat landscape and the centrality of universities, science and technology to the future 
security and prosperity of the UK. As their role and significance increase, universities 
become more valuable targets. Senior leaders must be aware of the risks and ensure that  
all members of their community are aware of their own roles and responsibilities in  
this regard.
The risks to universities are not limited to the theft of intellectual property and data,  
or the security of university campuses. There are also threats to the values that have 
underpinned the success of the higher education sector: academic freedom, freedom of 
speech and institutional autonomy. These values are rooted in the UK’s commitment to 
democracy and the rule of law.
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There is increasing awareness of the potential impact of these threats. In the last couple of 
months, attempts to access UK-based research related to Covid-19 (coronavirus) have been 
widely reported. The Australian National University has released a report into the impact  
of a data breach that took place in late 2018, which was the consequence of a successful  
and sophisticated cyber-attack. Other threats are less well-defined and understood, but a 
re clearly in evidence, such as activities intended to interfere with or undermine the  
values that underpin the success of the UK’s universities. Taking teaching online due to  
the Covid-19 crisis has presented new risks to the security of students and academic staff 
due to uncertainties over access to personal data and the unwarranted monitoring of 
learning activities.
The UK’s universities have always been a crucible for debate, covering both domestic and 
international issues, many of which have been or continue to be contentious. It is critically 
important that universities continue to play this role, providing the space for such debates 
to take place.
These guidelines are not intended to inhibit a bold and outward-looking higher  
education sector. Rather, UUK is seeking to equip universities with the tools to pursue  
their goals in a clear-sighted and risk-managed manner.
These guidelines are intended to complement the existing information, advice and 
guidance available to institutions, such as the Trusted Research campaign developed by 
the government authority for protective security advice, the Centre for the Protection of 
National Infrastructure (CPNI). These guidelines should be read in the wider context of 
the information available to institutions. Institutions should also make use of the support 
available from government.
Good governance and effective risk management processes will help to protect individuals, 
institutions and the sector from the legal, financial and reputational consequences of 
security-related risks. Without such protections, institutions are likely to suffer from 
significant reputational and financial ramifications. A proactive approach across the sector, 
at both an individual and institutional level, will allow institutions to realise the benefits of 
diverse international research collaboration. The ability of the higher education sector to 
provide greater assurance on the security of its international research collaborations,  
will have a positive impact on the prosperity and security of the UK.
In summary, universities have a leading role to play in the future prosperity and security 
of the UK and sustaining our shared values. These guidelines will help assure a future for 
extended international collaboration, safeguarding the excellence of the sector.
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SUMMARY
This summary provides an overview of the key messages and actions of these guidelines.
Overview
The governing body and executive leadership of the institution are responsible and 
accountable for protecting the institution against the threats and risks set out in these 
guidelines. To support them in performing this role, the governing body of the institution 
should receive an annual report describing the risks the institution faces and how the risks 
are being mitigated.
Structure of the guidelines
The guidelines are divided into four chapters:
• 1: Protecting your reputation and values – governance, processes and policies
• 2: Protecting your people – roles and responsibilities of those working or studying 
at the institution, measures to protect staff, students, and visitors and the risks of online 
contact
• 3: Protecting your campuses – cybersecurity and UK campuses
• 4: Protecting your partnerships – research security and transnational education.
The chapters are divided into thematic areas (see Table 1).
Table 1: Structure of these guidelines
Chapter Thematic areas
1: Protecting your 
reputation and values
1.1 Building resilience to security-related issues
1.2 Due diligence
1.3 Promoting the values of UK higher education
2: Protecting your people 2.1 Internal and external communications and  
knowledge-sharing
2.2 Protecting staff and students travelling and  
working overseas
3: Protecting your 
campuses
3.1 Cybersecurity, estates and visitors
4: Protecting your 
partnerships
4.1 Research security, intellectual property and  
export control compliance
4.2 Transnational education partnerships
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1: Protecting your reputation and values
 1.1: Building resilience to security-related issues [p14]
Your institution’s risk exposure is unique and depends on a range of factors. It will 
change over time as your institution and the environment change.
Establish security-related risk management as a key, ongoing priority. This should 
include:
• aligning policies and processes with your institution’s risk profile
• supporting and empowering individuals to identify and report security-related risks
• regularly reviewing risk frameworks to ensure that they are fit for purpose and in 
line with best practice.
 1.2: Due diligence [p18]
Your institution will have due diligence processes in place, but it is likely that these will 
have been primarily focused on financial and reputational risks. Your institution should 
look again at due diligence processes and ensure that:
• you consider reputational, ethical and security risks in your formal processes
• your institution is making good use of publicly available information, including 
information from the government
• you are building and sustaining a culture that enables staff to raise concerns about 
potential or current partnerships
• current and prospective partners are aware of your institution’s commitment to 
academic freedom and freedom of speech, and the implications for working in 
collaboration.
 1.3: Promoting the values of UK higher education [p23]
Rigorous, informed debate is the foundation of high-quality higher education and the 
advancement of knowledge. 
To identify and manage the risks of interference, you should:
• develop and promote clear codes of conduct, policies and legal agreements that 
enshrine the core values of academic freedom and freedom of speech 
• promote open and transparent communication, debate, research and enquiry about 
what interference might look like
• support staff and students to take responsibility for protecting against these 
infringements throughout their engagements and activities
• develop processes and mechanisms through which staff and students can report any 
concerns and receive support in relation to issues connected to academic freedom 
and freedom of speech.
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2: Protecting your people
 2.1: Internal and external communications and knowledge-sharing [p28]
Institutional policies and processes will help protect your institution, but they will 
not be effective without a culture of awareness, in which individuals understand their 
responsibilities to identify, report and manage security-related risks.
You should promote transparency, and in doing so, build confidence in your 
institution’s ability to undertake mutually beneficial international collaborations. 
 2.2: Protecting staff and students travelling and working overseas [p31]
Students and staff who are travelling in the course of their work and study may be 
exposed to specific, and in some cases severe, personal risks. 
Your institution should have processes in place that are proportionate and applied to all 
international travel. This should include adequate training for students and staff that 
ensures they understand the relevant policies and codes of conduct, and supports them 
to self-manage their risk.
3: Protecting your campuses
 3.1: Cybersecurity, estates and visitors [p35]
The UK’s universities are proudly dynamic, diverse and international institutions, 
bringing together staff, students and visitors from across the globe throughout the year. 
Institutions play an important civic role, supporting their communities and providing 
communal and open spaces.
Your institution should balance this civic role with the need to protect your institution 
and its assets. You should develop integrated estates and visitor policies and ensure that 
cybersecurity strategies are developed and implemented.
4: Protecting your partnerships
 4.1: Research security, intellectual property and export control compliance [p41]
The UK’s world-leading research is increasingly open and collaborative. This is 
fundamental to the UK’s success, but presents risks and challenges. Universities are 
subject to targeted attempts by individuals and organisations to improperly gain access 
to research and intellectual property (IP).
Your institution should be aware of the key security threats and challenges and take 
action to mitigate the risks by ensuring that your institution:
• conducts proportionate due diligence on all prospective overseas partners, for all 
types of collaboration
• implements policies and contractual agreements to protect IP 
• complies with export control legislation for controlled technologies, and other  
legal requirements. 
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4.2: Transnational education partnerships [p44]
UK universities hold a reputation as world leaders in transnational education (TNE), 
and there are nearly 700,000 students registered on UK programmes overseas. 
Transnational education arrangements are subject to local regulations and must comply 
with instructions from local authorities, a characteristic which brings greater risks.
Your institution should have risk mitigation policies that acknowledge and assess the 
existence of risks that may affect overseas partners differently. In particular, you should 
ensure your institution:
• undertakes thorough and regular due diligence on overseas partners
• recognises, within your risk registers and risk statements, risks related to 
institutional autonomy and academic freedom overseas
• balances requirements for local autonomy with robust, centralised risk management
• establishes clear reporting lines for communication with local stakeholders
• develops an exit strategy that is supported by a comprehensive, rules-based 
arrangement and high-level principles.
Additional resources
A wide range of resources have been developed to support your institution and your 
colleagues to understand and manage the risks identified in these guidelines. There 
are further resources in development, including on cybersecurity, export controls and 
protecting academic freedom. These guidelines will be periodically updated as and  
when these additional resources become available.
The Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and the National Cyber 
Security Centre (NCSC) have published material that will support institutions to make 
decisions and mitigate risk, including Trusted Research2. These resources are identified 
in the relevant sections of the guidelines. A list of all resources mentioned appears in the 
References at the end of these guidelines. 
2 www.cpni.gov.uk/trusted-research
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OVERVIEW
How to use these guidelines
Implementation of these guidelines will require buy-in from every member of the university 
community, but the responsibility for protecting your institution against the risks and 
threats set out in these guidelines cannot be delegated. The governing body and senior 
leadership team must establish a clear governance structure, identifying the staff members 
who will be responsible for managing the risks set out in these guidelines. The senior 
leadership team should provide the governing body with the appropriate assurance that the 
institution has an effective set of arrangements in place that are operating properly. This is 
likely to include transformational and cultural change, as well as changes to institutional 
systems, processes and policies.
We strongly recommend that the governing body of the institution receives 
an annual report on how the institution is managing security-related risks 
associated with internationalisation, describing the risks faced by the 
institution and how the risks are being mitigated. This should provide an overview 
of the systems and processes that are in place to manage security-related risks, while also 
protecting institutional autonomy and academic freedom, as well as information that sets 
out how the institution is raising awareness of these issues among the staff and student 
body of the institution.
Purpose of UUK’s work
Universities UK (UUK) has established a programme of work on security-related issues  
in higher education to realise three long-term goals: 
1. UK universities can demonstrate that they have coherent, proactive, strategic, and 
operational approaches to managing and mitigating international security threats.
2. UK universities are confident and able to pursue sustainable, secure international 
partnerships.
3. The UK higher education sector and the government have a clear, collaborative and 
constructive approach towards protecting and promoting growth in research and 
innovation (R&I), institutional autonomy and academic freedom in the context of 
security challenges.
To achieve these goals, UUK has identified three intermediate outcomes: 
• increased awareness and understanding among individuals, both staff and students,  
of security-related issues
• stronger institutional systems, processes and behaviours, 
• wider changes to the ecosystem including the interface between universities and 
government, and in the resilience of the system. 
These intermediate outcomes overlap with each other and are mutually reinforcing. 
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The purpose of these guidelines is to support institutions in making progress towards the 
first two outcomes. Through the use and distribution of these guidelines, we believe that 
there will be an increase in awareness and understanding of the issues that these guidelines 
cover. In turn, this will lead to changes in systems, processes and behaviours. These 
changes will benefit your international collaborations and the security, prosperity and 
continued success of your institution. Although UUK and the government have enabling 
roles in this, it is ultimately up to individual institutions to make sure they use  
the information, advice and guidance available to them to inform and drive change.
The changes required to the wider ecosystem of the sector, including in the interface 
between universities and government, is important, but isn’t directly addressed in these 
guidelines. The government and higher education sector are working together to ensure 
that the wider ecosystem supports universities to meet the challenges set out in this 
publication. The risks considered in these guidelines are both dynamic and complex. The 
debates and discussions around the issues considered in this set of guidelines are ongoing, 
and more support, including advice and guidance will be made available to institutions in 
due course. To support those ongoing discussions, we encourage users of the guidelines 
to contact UUK if they wish to contribute to this wider set of conversations, particularly if 
they have identified perverse incentives or other issues that might hinder, rather than help, 
individuals and institutions to respond to the issues covered by these guidelines.
Figure 1: Intermediate outcomes of the UUK’s approach to security-related issues
Changes in 
institutional 
systems,  
processes and 
behaviours
Changes in  
cross-sector 
systems and 
processes
Changes in 
awareness and 
understanding 
among  
individuals
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Figure 2: UUK programme of work
• UK universities can demonstrate that they have coherent, proactive  
strategic and operational approaches to managing and mitigating  
security-related risks.
• UK universities maintain and grow sustainable, secure international 
partnerships.
• The sector and government have a clear, collaborative and constructive 
approach towards protecting and promoting research and innovation 
growth, institutional autonomy and academic freedom in the context of 
security challenges.
Changes in awareness 
and understanding 
Institutional leaders 
have a better 
understanding of 
need for security risk 
management strategies.
Researchers, research 
managers and other 
relevant staff have a 
better understanding 
about what security-
related risks mean in the 
context of their work.
UUK develop better 
understanding of sector 
needs and practice in 
relation to achieving the 
right balance between 
opportunity and risk.
Changes in institutional 
systems, processes, 
behaviours 
Improved institutional 
governance 
arrangements  
and policies.
Researchers, managers 
and other relevant staff 
have increased skills 
and confidence to follow 
recommended protocols 
and procedures. 
More researchers, 
managers and other 
relevant staff adhere to 
recommended protocols 
and procedures.
New investment within 
institutions around the  
security agenda. 
Changes in cross-
sector systems  
and processes 
Alignment of security 
priorities, policies and 
messaging across the 
sector.
Increased government 
confidence in sector 
approach to security-
related risks. 
The sector benefits 
from alignment 
with and learning 
from international 
approaches and best 
practice.
Joined-up, coherent messaging, policies and legislative frameworks from 
different government departments around higher education research and 
innovation, international growth and security management. 
Clear commitment to and accountability for proactive security risk 
management strategies within institutions and across government 
departments; named contacts supporting streamlined cross-sector 
communication.
Clear, up-to-date and easy-to-use guidance/best practice disseminated 
effectively to the right audiences.
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1
PROTECTING YOUR 
REPUTATION AND 
VALUES
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Overview
The success of your institution depends on its reputation, and the success of the UK’s 
universities is underpinned by the reputation of the UK higher education sector, and its 
shared values of academic freedom, freedom of speech and institutional autonomy. 
This chapter is intended to support your institution in protecting its reputation and the 
values that underpin the success of the UK higher education sector. As a senior leader, your 
risk awareness will be more developed than that of many others in your institution. Your 
visible endorsement of a secure approach to international collaboration is vital to successful 
implementation and compliance across your institution.
Much will rest on institutional resilience to security-related issues. This chapter details how 
institutional resilience can be strengthened by: 
• developing a positive, risk-informed culture, underpinned by robust governance, 
reporting and risk-management structures
• incorporating security-related issues into due diligence procedures, particularly so 
as to secure a comprehensive understanding of the UK’s legislative and regulatory 
requirements when forming international agreements and partnerships
• securing clear policies and processes that build a culture of collective responsibility 
for upholding the values of academic freedom, freedom of speech and institutional 
autonomy, as well as the protection of students and staff.
The audit committee of your governing body should include a standing item 
on security related risks on its risk register.
1.1: Building resilience to security-related issues
Develop a risk-literate, risk-aware culture
Senior leaders improve institutional resilience to security-related issues by prioritising 
the development of a positive, risk-literate, risk-aware culture and implementing clear 
governance, reporting and risk-management structures that promote the strengths and 
values of UK higher education.
There are steps senior leadership teams should take to facilitate successful international 
collaborations, while ensuring that exposure to security-related risks are identified and 
managed. This is a strategic priority for senior leaders of higher education institutions.
As leaders, you are highly skilled in risk management and invest significantly in the 
development and maintenance of due diligence, governance and reporting processes to 
ensure international collaborations are of the highest quality.
While the vast majority of international collaborations are welcome and mutually beneficial, 
it is essential that you remain alert to activities that may threaten the security and standing 
of your institution. These activities include the targeting of institutions such as yours to 
obtain sensitive information, suppress or manipulate academic freedoms, and exploit the 
excellence of the UK higher education sector. These activities have financial, legal and 
reputational consequences for those institutions and individuals involved. Accordingly, it 
is essential for your institution’s continued success – and for the security and prosperity of 
the UK – that you understand your institution’s exposure to these risks and prioritise its 
protection.
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In the development of these guidelines, senior leaders at UK institutions highlighted key 
challenges that prevent or hinder the effective management of security-related risks:
• incomplete understanding among senior leadership teams and key individuals of the 
nature and scale of security-related risks, and their responsibilities to manage them
• institutional cultures where staff may be unaware of the risks or not sufficiently 
empowered to act on the risks that they have identified within the risk-management 
processes
• risk-management, governance and reporting processes that are not regularly updated  
or equipped to respond to the changing nature of these risks.
Identify and manage exposure to security-related risks
Your institution’s risk exposure is unique and depends on a range of factors, including the 
nature and scope of your activity, and the risk awareness and management culture you have 
fostered. Your risk exposure will change over time.
Failure to manage security-related risks may result in serious consequences – financial, 
legal, and reputational. In some cases, consequences may be felt beyond your institution 
and affect the national security and prosperity of the UK.
Non-compliance with relevant legislation and regulations, and contractual arrangements, 
including export controls, the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) and  
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), may expose you, your institution or 
individuals within your institution to criminal charges or litigation. The nature and terms 
of your collaborations and duties of care, as well as the information individuals have access 
to, will give rise to specific and evolving legal obligations. Classified research materials, 
for example, are subject to specific and enforceable handling requirements.3 Where 
collaborations include overseas activity, you may be subject to local legislation  
and regulations.
Consequences may result from individual risks or as a result of cumulative risk. As a senior 
leader, you are one of the few people in your institution appropriately placed to identify 
cumulative risk exposure, and, with your governing body, determine your institution’s  
risk profile. Accordingly, you must consider where the combined effect of investments  
and activities may create an environment in which your institution is exposed to undue  
external leverage.
International collaborations are fundamental to the academic, reputational and financial 
success and sustainability of UK universities. However, there are potential adverse and 
long-term implications of, for example, undertaking non-secure research collaborations. 
This may render your institution unable to attract future funding or realise the commercial 
or financial benefits of innovation because research, data or other materials have been 
stolen, compromised or used in contravention of national and international agreements.4 
Joint research is particularly vulnerable to misuse by organisations and institutions that 
operate in other countries.
3 Further information on export controls is set out in Section 4.1.
4 Theft could occur systematically over a prolonged period of time, rather than as a one-off event.
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Reputational damage may result from the improper management of security-related risks 
and affect your institution’s ability to maintain high-quality provision and attract and/or 
retain funding, students, staff and accreditation.
In short, you should proactively consider security-related risks that have the potential to 
affect your institution’s standing and the UK’s security and prosperity.
The descriptions above are not exhaustive and additional information can be found in the 
following sections:
• Cybersecurity, estates and visitors (see Section 3.1)
• Research security, intellectual property and export control compliance (see Section 4.1)
• Protecting staff and students travelling and working overseas (see Section 2.2)
Your institution is not alone in facing these risks. Knowledge-sharing and engagement, 
including instances in which engagement is required by law, are covered in more detail 
under internal and external communications (see Section 2.1).
Establish security-related risk management as a key, ongoing priority
Your institution will have a range of risk-management, governance and reporting 
frameworks and capabilities in place to manage risk. Risks, including those related to 
academic freedom and freedom of speech, should be covered in these processes and 
publicised widely across your institution. 
A shared understanding of the policies and processes in place to manage these risks, 
including individual responsibilities to proactively report and escalate security-related risks, 
is crucial to fostering a culture of awareness and security and is discussed further under 
internal and external communications (see Section 2.1).
Policies and processes must align with your institution’s risk profile. A higher risk profile 
may necessitate more robust due diligence processes and oversight and subject your 
institution to additional scrutiny. Assessment of your risk profile must be informed by a 
robust understanding of your legal obligations.
It is vital that individuals within your institution feel able and supported to identify 
security-related risks, without fear of retribution or censorship. Institutions should have in 
place appropriate policies and processes so that staff know how to report issues or concerns. 
This may be especially contentious where it is perceived to intersect with religious, national, 
racial or social identities or is conflated with prejudice or racism. Despite this, institutions 
will need to address these issues, ensuring that appropriate policies and processes are  
in place.
These risks are dynamic. As the threats evolve, so too should the systems and processes 
in place to manage them. Risk frameworks should be regularly reviewed to ensure they 
are fit for purpose and in line with best practice. In certain circumstances, independent 
organisations may need to provide assurance of the controls in place.
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Case study: Governance
The case studies in these guidelines are hypothetical, and they are intended to support  
the user to apply these guidelines in practice.
The senior leadership team at a UK higher education institution requested a review  
of its institution’s governance processes for international collaborations. The review  
was in response to an increase in the scale, scope and variety of the institution’s 
international partnerships and sought to identify policies that would facilitate safe  
and sustainable partnerships.  
As a result of the review, ‘significant international collaborations or partnerships’  
required explicit authorisation from the vice-chancellor, including:
• any project that may result in the establishment of a joint campus or representation  
of the institution overseas 
• any venture or entity wholly or partially funded by international partners 
• any project requiring staff to be based overseas for extended periods
• any project with novel or contentious characteristics that could involve reputational, 
security or legal risks, irrespective of monetary value. 
To assist the vice-chancellor, an international group was formed, chaired by the deputy 
vice-chancellor international and comprising relevant professional services and senior 
academic staff. This policy change was communicated across the institution. 
The scenario 
A collaboration opportunity was presented to the international group. Academics from 
the institution were invited to travel to an overseas university, deliver a series of guest 
lectures on their area of expertise (plant biology) and provide generic advice on establishing 
research facilities. Their travel and accommodation costs would be fully covered by the 
international partners, but they would not receive any further compensation. 
The international group had initial reservations about this collaboration. Web searches 
relating to the overseas university returned limited results and its representatives, although 
forthcoming in their disclosures, had been sporadic in their contact. Further enquiries, 
including contact with an overseas embassy, revealed that the proposed partner institution 
had been established for a year and had reached out to a number of UK and other 
international institutions and organisations for assistance and collaboration. A number of 
these collaborations had taken place without issue. 
The international group determined that, with appropriate safeguards in place, the project 
was a promising opportunity. Despite not being financially lucrative to the university, 
the partner country would benefit from being able to improve local farming techniques 
and allow the university to develop a presence in an overseas market and could attract 
additional investment opportunities. 
Following consideration of relevant advice, the UK institution ensured that:
• travelling academics only took and had access to the information they needed while 
travelling, with safeguards in place so that they were temporarily unable to access 
collaborative datasets and their institution’s intranet while outside the UK
• planned advice relating to research facilities was generic and high level, and not in 
conflict with the UK’s strategic export controls
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• the academics understood they were not to accept any further gifts or offers from the 
overseas institution, and advised on how best to decline offers in a culturally sensitive 
manner, so as to not offend their hosts
• legal advice was sought before the trip, which found no problem with the collaboration 
agreement, but identified that virtual private networks (VPNs) were illegal in the 
overseas country, and recommended further input from cybersecurity colleagues. 
The collaboration went ahead without issue. Although there has been limited engagement 
since the visit, the academics found the trip useful and have recommended the international 
group as a useful and necessary service to colleagues.
Additional resources on resilience
• CPNI Trusted Research: Guidance for senior leaders available at:  
www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/Trusted%20Research%20Guidance%20for%20
Senior%20Leaders.pdf
1.2: Due diligence
Productive international collaborations are fundamental to the success of the UK 
higher education sector and its reputation for quality, diversity and impact. While most 
international partnerships benefit all parties, there will be a small number of cases where 
there are significant risks. In some instances, parties may engage in bad faith, seek benefits 
beyond the terms of the agreement or extend activity beyond that set out in the agreement. 
Accordingly, robust due diligence, which is subject to regular review, is essential to facilitate 
strong, successful, mutually beneficial international partnerships, and to minimise harm to 
institutions, the sector and the interests of the UK.
Senior management should provide assurances to the institution’s governing body 
that security-related issues are fully incorporated into due diligence, to promote a 
comprehensive understanding of the partnership and awareness of legislative and 
regulatory requirements in the UK and any other countries involved.
The UK’s universities regularly conduct due diligence on prospective partners. To date, 
this activity has primarily focused on financial and reputational risk. We encourage 
institutions to look again at their existing due diligence processes, with consideration of 
the government’s and other guidance and to consider the efficacy of their due diligence 
processes and how they assess reputational, ethical and security risks.
Universities are autonomous institutions, and it is up to individual universities to determine 
how best to mitigate risks, in accordance with the relevant legislation and regulations, as 
well as what an appropriate level of risk is. This assessment should be proportionate and is 
likely to be informed by the scale and nature of the planned collaboration and the location 
and the status of the partner.
This section provides information and guidance that will help institutions to develop due 
diligence processes that assess the security-related risks and mitigate potential damage 
to the institution. The section is divided into three parts: know your partner; strike and 
maintain robust agreements; and establish a clear set of roles and responsibilities for staff.
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Know your partner
UK universities have a complex network of international engagement, ranging from 
informal collaborations, such as dialogue and co-operation between individual staff to 
formal partnerships, including transnational education. Some of these collaborations will 
expose the institution to security-related threats. These collaborations are necessarily 
shaped by the countries in which partners are based. As a result, governance and due 
diligence should be tailored accordingly. For example, public records may be limited in 
some jurisdictions, and it might not be possible to obtain detailed records.
Although informal collaborations are unlikely to be covered by the institution’s formal 
policies or procedures, risks remain. Your institution should consider how it supports 
staff to make informed decisions outside your formal policies and procedures, including 
requiring staff to disclose partnerships and collaborations wherever possible. This will 
ensure that your institution has visibility of any conflicts of interest and other legal, 
reputational or financial risks associated with informal collaborations.
Make risk-informed decisions
How does your institution support academics to make informed decisions outside formal 
due diligence processes? For more formal partnerships with an international university, 
company or government agency, due diligence must include enquiry into the partner’s past 
activities, the sector it operates in, as well as the commercial and ethical standing of its 
governing body, and the legal and regulatory environment of the proposed partner.
Universities typically ask partner organisations to complete a questionnaire or submit 
documentation or evidence that is then used to assess the level of risk involved in working 
with the partner. Universities also make use of the academic experts employed at their 
institution, web searches, subscription services and professional firms. How does your 
institution use publicly available information to enhance its understanding of partners, 
their links to other activities or states, and the legislative context in which they operate? 
To what extent is your institution able to undertake or commission background checks on 
prospective partners and their employees, in the same way major businesses in the private 
sector would?
In any partnership, the risks depend to a significant extent on the collaborative activity 
being proposed. Some activities are covered by specific legislation, regulations and codes 
of conduct, such as the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) or export control 
legislation.5 Do your institutional risk management frameworks recognise and respond to 
relevant legislation, regulations and codes of conduct? To what extent is your institution 
drawing on the advice and expertise of the UK Government to make decisions?
Strike and maintain robust agreements
Due diligence on prospective international partners should be proportionate and  
reference relevant legal and regulatory provisions. It should include consideration of all 
security-related risks, including any risks to academic freedom that are associated with 
international partnerships. Be clear about monitoring data, and who is responsible for 
reporting what to whom.
5 For further information on ATAS or export control legislation, please consult Section 4.1, particularly the additional resources.
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For all formal interactions with partner organisations or individuals, use best practice 
contracting mechanisms and policies to manage security-related risks. Terms and 
conditions of agreements or memoranda of understanding should include clauses that 
protect the integrity of academic activity. 
Internal stakeholders, including professional services staff, benefit from training and 
awareness sessions and from simple risk assessment tools to manage engagement activity, 
including visits and delegations.
Due diligence to mitigate security-related risks should be undertaken regularly, with 
regular reviews in relation to international partnerships and projects, including research 
partnerships, as well as sources of income, such as investments, donations, philanthropy, 
commercialisation, capital investment, tuition fee income and staff honorary and 
consultancy appointments. Full consideration should be given to the potential for  
security breaches in every engagement, from the most informal collaboration to the  
most formal partnership.
The UK institution should have in place an appropriate exit strategy with provisions in 
place, along with an understanding of what would trigger an exit. Ultimately, this could 
include the right to withdraw from the agreement or terminate it early without incurring 
any liabilities if the ongoing due diligence exercise reveals that the overseas organisation 
or researcher is no longer an appropriate partner. An example would be where the ongoing 
due diligence exercise reveals that the university’s legal obligation to maintain academic 
freedom is under threat. 
Specific legal advice should be sought in relation to contract design and ensuring the 
appropriate protections are in place.
Partner organisations or individuals may seek to access or influence particular areas of 
activity through various forms of funding arrangements and other inducements targeted 
at individuals. To mitigate this, individuals and institutions should be transparent about 
their sources of funding. Due diligence should establish which processes exist to manage 
security-related risks when considering sources of potential income.
Establish clear roles and responsibilities for staff
Universities already have procedures and policies in place to help identify, develop and 
manage risks associated with international engagements. There is growing awareness of 
security-related risks, and universities should support staff to identify these risks and to  
act on them.
Key outcomes
• Ensure that due diligence processes consider reputational, ethical and security risks.
• Use publicly available information to enhance your understanding of partners and  
their links to other activities or states. Where necessary, seek further information  
the UK government.
• Build and sustain a culture that enables staff to raise concerns, coupled with processes 
that enable the institution to consider whether activities raise reputational, ethical  
and/or security risks.
• Ensure that partners understand the UK institution’s commitment to academic  
freedom and freedom of speech and any potential implications this might have for  
the collaboration or partnership
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Case study: Multi-institution collaborative partnership
The case studies in these guidelines are hypothetical, and they are intended to support the 
user to apply these guidelines in practice.
Two UK universities sought to work collaboratively on a fundamental research programme. 
The institutions bid for and were successful in securing funding through a specific UK 
government funding programme in partnership with a research council. The bidding 
process involved the international partner in the funding programme partnering the  
UK universities with two organisations from that country.
The scenario
The understanding in the scientific community about the funding programme is that the 
international side brings to the table those entities that they have decided should be funded. 
The UK consortium had assumed that because the grant was approved by the funding 
programme and the research council that the international entities would be appropriate. 
As a result, insufficient due diligence was undertaken by the UK collaborating universities.
The programme was supported and subsequently delivered a successful collaborative 
research programme through to completion, with some of the work being published in 
research journals. 
The universities were alerted to the fact that the programme could have breached export 
control regulations and, had it not been completed, would have been issued with an end-use 
notification to suspend the programme. Both university partners had equal responsibility 
for the lack of due diligence and the potential impact on their reputation and that of the 
institution.
Lessons learned
• Overseas partners may attempt to access the early development stages of new technology 
and research before it is subject to export control legislation.
• UK partners in collaborative proposals must all take responsibility for due diligence and 
ongoing audit, which should be overseen by senior colleagues.
• Robust due diligence is required for all international partnerships and collaborations, 
including those funded by UKRI, UK research councils and other government 
departments. 
• The situation could have been mitigated by relevant points of contact being appointed in 
each university to share information with other institutions and government and to own 
the due diligence and auditing process.
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Additional resources on due diligence
• ARMA
Consolidated Approach to Assurance and Due Diligence project available at:
https://arma.ac.uk/first-output-from-the-consolidated-approach-to-assurance-and-
due-diligence-project/
Due diligence
• CPNI
Campaign implementation plan available at:
www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/Trusted%20Research%20Implementation%20Guide.pdf
• CPNI
Checklist: Evaluating research proposals available at:
www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/Trusted%20Research%20Checklist%20for%20
Academia.pdf
• CPNI
Trusted Research: Guidance for Academia available at:
www.cpni.gov.uk/trusted-research-guidance-academia
Sources to help identify international collaborations or partnerships that fall into the 
high-risk category:
• UN Sanctions List
• US export entity control list
• HM Treasury’s financial sanctions targets
• Country corruption index
• Human Freedom Index
• World Justice Project Rule of Law Index
Templates and frameworks for due diligence
• Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (country overviews and risk briefings) 
https://country.eiu.com/All
• FCDO & DfIT
Overseas business risks available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/overseas-business-risk
• Global Edge (sources of statistical information for countries worldwide) 
https://globaledge.msu.edu/global-insights/by/country
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1.3: Promoting the values of UK higher education
Institutions have clear policies and processes that build a culture of collective responsibility 
for upholding our values of academic freedom, freedom of speech and institutional 
autonomy.
Rigorous, informed debate is at the foundation of high-quality higher education and the 
advancement of knowledge, underpinned by values of academic freedom and freedom of 
speech. We must work together proactively to ensure the key values of UK higher education 
are understood, protected and championed at every level of the institution.
However, there are a small number of well-documented examples in the public domain of 
international governments and organisations attempting to interfere overtly or covertly in 
our universities, and to undermine the reputation of individual universities and the sector 
as a whole.
Interference and influence
The concepts of ‘influence’ and ‘interference’ are significant here.6 Interference comprises 
malign activity by another state or those acting on its behalf that is designed to have a 
detrimental effect on the interests of the UK. This activity can be deceptive, coercive or 
corruptive. It includes the use of agents of influence, leverage of investments, financial 
inducement, disinformation and disruptive or malicious cyber-activities.
In the context of the UK higher education sector, interference would include malign activity 
that is contrary to the values and interests of a UK higher education institution. This 
might include, for example, attempts to alter course content and curricula. In research, it 
might include the theft of research outputs or data. In some instances, the subject of the 
interference may not realise that they are a victim of interference.
All governments, including the UK government, try to influence deliberations on issues of 
importance to them. These activities, when conducted in an open and transparent manner, 
are a normal aspect of international relations and diplomacy and can contribute positively 
to public debate. In the context of the UK higher education sector, influence would include 
activity that is intended to promote open international collaboration, and the interests 
of the university. This might include, for example, the hosting of cultural exchanges or 
mutually beneficial international collaborations or partnerships.
The examples provided above are unambiguous. However, the distinction between 
interference and influence can be vague. Influence might lead to self-censorship and an 
environment that appears closed in terms of transparency and accountability to staff.  
Open, transparent debate within an institution is an effective way to manage these risks.
6  The definition of influence in this section has been based on the definition used by the Australian University Foreign  
Interference Taskforce.
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To counter interference, which may carry significant institutional risks and adversely affect 
the security of your institution, senior leaders must consider the risks that are posed to 
academic freedom, freedom of speech and institutional autonomy and promote resilience 
to potential infringements. Section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986 for England and 
Wales places a duty on every individual and body of persons concerned in the government 
of a provider to take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that freedom of 
speech within the law is secured for members, students, employees and visiting speakers. It 
also requires providers to issue and keep up to date a code of conduct regarding freedom of 
speech. Every individual and body of persons concerned in the governance of the institution 
must take such steps as are reasonably practicable (including, where appropriate, the 
initiation of disciplinary measures) to secure that the requirements of the code of conduct 
are complied with.
Academic freedom and freedom of speech and expression have long been core tenets of 
academic culture in the UK. These concepts are nuanced and complex, and universities 
have a role to play in ensuring that these concepts are better understood by all members of 
the university community, including visiting staff and students. Universities should build 
understanding and consensus around these concepts by developing codes of conduct and 
policies that clearly set out the institution’s position on them, as well as clearly demarcating 
the legal protections or legislation relevant to these concepts.
Universities need to set out clear statements on interference and to develop policies and 
procedures to ensure that these are upheld.
Key actions
• Develop and promote clear codes of conduct, policies and legal agreements that enshrine
the avoidance of interference alongside the core values of academic freedom and
freedom of speech.
• Promote open and transparent communication, debate, research and enquiry about
what interference in academic freedom, freedom of speech and institutional autonomy
might look like, and support staff and students to take responsibility for protecting
against these infringements throughout their engagements and activities.
• Develop processes and mechanisms through which staff and students can report, raise
concerns and receive support in relation to issues connected to academic freedom and
freedom of speech, including issues arising from interference.
• Promote open and transparent communication, debate, research and enquiry about
our shared values, and support staff and students to take responsibility for protecting
against attempts to undermine them.
Encourage open and transparent discussion
To encourage open and transparent discussion about the importance of academic freedom 
and freedom of speech to the integrity and identity of UK higher education institutions, 
senior staff should promote debate, research and enquiry about these issues across their 
institutions. They should also raise awareness about the range of ways in which academic 
freedom and freedom of speech can be undermined by foreign interference. Universities 
will wish to engage a broad range of staff and students, including trade unions and student 
unions, professional services staff as well as academics, honorary staff, contractors and 
visitors to campuses through, for example, mandatory staff training.
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Develop processes and mechanisms for raising concerns 
Institutions should develop confidential mechanisms and spaces to allow both staff and 
students to raise any concerns that they may have relating to interference in the same way 
as they can for academic freedom and freedom of speech. This could involve adapting 
institutional ethics processes.
There should be clear and transparent lines of reporting in place to ensure that these cases are 
brought to the attention of senior leaders in a timely fashion and escalated where necessary. 
As UK universities increase their operations overseas, they may find that the legal and 
social frameworks of other countries do not necessarily match those of the UK in respect of, 
for example, to anti-discrimination policies and the protection of individual rights. These 
should be assessed within the normal risk management framework.
While recognising that UK norms of academic freedom and freedom of speech may not be 
legally upheld in other countries, universities can still take measures to ensure that core 
values such as equality and diversity are respected within the university’s own scope and 
working environment. For example, a university might publish a charter of values for staff 
working internationally, clearly stating the implications of the university’s commitment to 
values of equality, diversity and respect, while recognising the laws and cultural norms of 
the country. These issues are explored further in Section 4.
Consider issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction
Individuals in the UK may be subject to laws passed by other countries that have 
extraterritorial application. These laws are not enforceable in the UK, but may pose 
challenges to future international travel, activities in or, in the case of international 
students or academics, return to certain countries. Extraterritorial jurisdiction could have 
a potentially chilling effect on activities in the UK, where academics and students may feel 
less able to participate in academic debate or progress research on certain topics that may 
be deemed sensitive by, and potentially subject to legal restrictions in, another nation state.
Institutions should consider the implications of laws with extraterritorial application for 
their students, staff and visitors. In response legislation with extraterritorial implications, 
some academic institutions have introduced protections for students. This has included, 
for example, identifying without modifying course material to students that might be 
considered politically sensitive in certain states. Institutions could also take steps to protect 
students by introducing the Chatham House rule to seminars or other oral discussions, and 
otherwise introducing measures that allow students to submit coursework anonymously.
There are specific challenges to consider in the delivery of online programmes that could 
potentially be recorded. Institutions will want to consider carefully how they can protect 
staff and students in these contexts. 
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Additional resources on promoting values
• EHRC
Freedom of Expression: a guide for higher education providers and students’ unions in
England and Wales available at:
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/freedom-of-expression-
guide-for-higher-education-providers-and-students-unions-england-and-wales.pdf
• Kinzelbach, Saliba, Spannagel & Quinn Free Universities:
Putting the Academic Freedom Index Into Action available at:
www.gppi.net/media/KinzelbachEtAl_2020_Free_Universities.pdf
• Scholars at Risk
Values at Home and in Partnership available at:
www.scholarsatrisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Values-at-Home-and-in-
Partnerships.pdf
• University of Chicago
Foundational Principles available at:
https://freeexpression.uchicago.edu/foundational-principles/
• Academic Freedom and Internationalisation Working Group Model Code of Conduct
available at:
https://hrc.sas.ac.uk/networks/academic-freedom-and-internationalisation-working-
group/model-code-conduct
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2 
PROTECTING YOUR 
PEOPLE
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OVERVIEW
This chapter is intended to support your institution to protect its people, both students and 
staff, and visitors to your institution. The best way to achieve this is to develop and support 
a culture in which everyone is aware of security-related risks and understands their own 
exposure to them. UK universities are complex and diverse, and count citizens from across 
the world in their communities. Consequently, developing such a culture will not always be 
straightforward.
Every member of your community has a role to play in identifying, reporting and managing 
security-related risks. The first part of this chapter considers how these responsibilities 
might be made clear using internal and external communications. Your institution also  
has a role to play in communicating with government.
The second section of this chapter is concerned with protecting staff and students who are 
travelling and working overseas, and the steps that your institution might take to support 
those individuals.
Internal communications should be used to promote a culture of awareness and reinforce 
individual responsibilities to identify, report and manage security-related risks. External 
communications should promote transparency and build confidence in your institution’s 
ability to undertake mutually beneficial international collaborations or partnerships. 
Institutions should share information with each other and government to identify best 
practice and increase resilience.
Senior leaders should have confidence that there are processes and procedures to ensure 
short- and long-term overseas activities to address security-related risks and to promote  
the safety and welfare of staff and students.
2.1: Internal and external communications and knowledge-sharing
Internal communications should be used to promote a culture of awareness and to reinforce 
individual responsibilities to identify, report and manage security-related risks. External 
communications should promote transparency and build confidence in your institution’s 
ability to undertake mutually beneficial international collaborations or partnerships. 
Institutions should share information with each other and government to identify best 
practice and increase resilience.
This section outlines how existing communication channels should be used to promote 
mutually beneficial international collaborations or partnerships. It describes how 
institutions should engage with each other and government to strengthen sector responses 
to security challenges. This section is divided into three parts: internal communications, 
external communications and knowledge-sharing.
Internal communications
A positive, risk-informed culture develops out of a communal awareness and appreciation 
of risk. Internal communications are crucial when building a shared understanding of 
risk and should be available in a range of formats to cater to a diverse student and staff 
population. Communications should emphasise that everyone, including visiting students 
and staff, has a role to play in maintaining a secure campus environment and protecting 
their colleagues and peers. Communications should also detail the consequences of 
inadequate risk management.
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Resources should be available to assist students and staff in understanding the risks 
associated with international collaborations and partnerships and how best to manage their 
specific obligations.7 Supplementary training and institution-specific resources may also 
need to be developed by your institution. Training and resources should reflect the likely 
risks faced by individual members of your community.
External communications
External communications can be used to demonstrate that your institution is robust in its 
response to managing and mitigating security-related risks. We suggest that institutions 
publicly commit to the recommendations of this guidance and make as many of the policies 
and processes open as is practicable.
Knowledge-sharing
Sharing information and experiences across the sector and with government will assist the 
development of a common understanding of the nature and scale of the problem and best 
practice. To help coordinate activity and support institutions, identify a central point of 
contact for the issues set out in these guidelines and identify this individual to UUK.  
This will simplify cross-sector and sector–government engagement.
Your institution and staff will already be engaged with sector bodies and professional 
membership associations. These organisations will play an important role in sharing  
best practice and ideas to help your institution introduce the changes this document 
envisages. Over the next 12 months, UUK will systematically engage with sector bodies 
and professional membership associations to ensure that they have the information,  
advice and guidance they need. 
It is important to engage in cross-sector dialogue (including those led by sector bodies) 
and to highlight your experiences, share best practice and build resilience to shared issues. 
Where appropriate, you should also engage with government. An understanding of the 
nature, frequency and scope of risk will support government in responding effectively 
through diplomatic or other channels.
Case study: Internal communications
The case studies in these guidelines are hypothetical, and they are intended to support 
the user to apply these guidelines in practice.
Scenario 1
A staff member has concerns about an existing research partnership. They believe that 
the partner is being used as a front to gain access to sensitive research undertaken at the 
institution. Representatives from the partner organisation have repeatedly demanded 
access to material beyond the scope of the contractual agreement. The staff member has 
denied all the partner’s requests, but has become aware that the partner has submitted  
the same requests to other members of university staff.
7 Such resources might include, for example, information about the risks of IP theft and academic freedom.
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How would the staff member raise their concerns at your institution? Universities will 
need to consider:
• how reporting works within their current structures
• which person or group has ultimate oversight of reporting
• what safeguards are in place to prevent improper access.
In this scenario, the staff member recognised behaviours of concern. A further attempt 
to gain access to material was also rebuffed. What processes and procedures does your 
institution have in place to educate staff about potential risks, and ensure consistency  
of response? 
Scenario 2
A postgraduate student received an unsolicited email from a researcher based outside 
the UK. The email congratulated the student on a recent co-authored journal article and 
asked if he would be willing to discuss the research and paper in more detail. The student 
did not recognise the emailer’s name or home university, but, excited by the opportunity, 
responded saying he would be more than happy to discuss his work.
The student’s supervisor was glad to see the paper had received attention and indicated 
she would join the call if possible. She suggested that the student fill in a short online form, 
as required by the department before any form of international engagement. The student 
submitted the form and was advised the next day that he should decline the meeting. The 
email he had received was sent to several researchers across the institution – on a wide 
variety of research topics – and was deemed to be suspicious and unlikely to be genuine.
In this scenario, the student followed departmental protocol and the request for a 
discussion about the research was ultimately declined. What internal processes do you have 
in place to support academics in making decisions in these and similar circumstances? 
You’ll need to consider:
• whether internal processes are fit for purpose, and likely to be followed by staff
• how the institution can support academics to make decisions, and secure their buy-in
for internal processes.
Additional resources on communications and knowledge-sharing
• CPNI
Developing a Security Culture available at:
https://www.cpni.gov.uk/developing-security-culture
• CPNI
Optimising People in Security available at:
https://www.cpni.gov.uk/optimising-people-security
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2.2: Protecting staff and students travelling and working overseas
Senior leaders should have confidence that there are processes and procedures to  
address security-related risks, and to promote the safety and welfare of staff and students 
travelling overseas.
Students and staff travel all over the world in the course of their work and study. As a 
consequence of this travel, individuals may be exposed to specific, and in some cases severe, 
personal risks. This section considers how best to protect students, staff and institutional 
interests overseas. 
It is important that you have robust processes and systems in place to assess the value and 
risk of all overseas engagements and activities – regardless of length or scale.
Plan travel arrangements
Many university staff and students regularly travel overseas in the course of their 
employment or study. In most cases, this short-term travel, irrespective of the purpose, will 
involve a similar degree of risk exposure as similar activity in the UK. However, in certain 
cases, individuals or universities may be exposed to significantly higher and unfamiliar 
risks. For example, students and academics involved in advanced or emerging technologies 
are likely to be of greater interest to local and national authorities.
Conduct due diligence and risk assessments
Section 1.2 above provides advice on implementing effective risk frameworks and due 
diligence processes for international partnerships. Specific processes are required for 
overseas travel that account for different risk environments, differences in legal, social and 
cultural norms in overseas countries, and changing operating environments abroad.
Where academics are area specialists, they should be engaged as experts on the country to 
inform university decision-making on risk levels and in providing information to staff.
Coherent safe travel policies must outline the steps needed for safely managing overseas 
travel and related activities, and outline clear approval processes, including processes 
for escalating high or unusual risks for institutional approval. Travel policies should also 
consider how export controls and other UK laws apply in each circumstance, and the 
implications of local and extraterritorial legislation on the person travelling overseas.
It is crucial that the processes in place are proportionate and applied to all international 
travel. Institutions should maintain records of overseas travel and draw on internal 
and external knowledge of the specific risks associated with travel to certain countries 
or regions. In addition, institutions should establish a formal method for monitoring 
and reviewing processes and procedures regularly, not just following an incident. See 
‘Additional resources’ below for more sources of guidance.
Travel to certain countries requires special consideration and preparation. Processes should 
be in place to educate students and staff about specific security-related risks. This should 
include adequate training for students and staff to ensure that they understand the relevant 
policies and codes of conduct, as well as what is required of them and other obligations 
before travelling overseas.
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Case study: Loss of data while overseas
The case studies in these guidelines are hypothetical, and they are intended to support the 
user to apply these guidelines in practice.
An overseas university extended a VIP invitation to a UK-based professor to present 
the keynote lecture at a national conference in their country. This presented a welcome 
opportunity for the professor to showcase her research, make senior-level contacts and to 
profile the department at a prestigious international conference. All the costs of attending 
would be covered for the professor and one guest, including business-class air travel, luxury 
hotel accommodation and subsistence costs. These were declared to the university ahead  
of travel.
As the professor had travelled to the country before and felt the risks to be negligible, a 
travel risk assessment was not completed. The professor signed a participation agreement 
with the host institution upon arrival.
The scenario
To present at the conference, the professor took her university laptop which, due to her 
institution’s single-device policy, was her main device. She regularly charged the device in 
her hotel room and permitted conference organisers to plug in portable storage and other 
devices to facilitate her presentation. Her keynote lecture and visit were successful and  
well received.
Many months later, the professor was very concerned to see her unpublished research 
presented by a university based in the country where she had given the keynote speech. 
After reviewing the participation agreement for the conference, the professor realised 
she had signed over rights to the material presented at the conference, including the 
unpublished materials previewed during her presentation. 
Lessons learned
• The institution had lacked appropriate risk assessment and governance processes
to identify and allocate responsibilities for staff, students and academics ahead of
all overseas travel.
• Appropriate travel approval and risk assessments are necessary ahead of all
overseas travel.
• Complacency may influence the robustness of protocols followed in cases where a
country or partner is already known to the institutions or the person travelling overseas.
• Travelling academics and researchers require training on relevant security policies,
including the ways in which data may be stolen or compromised.
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Additional resources on protecting staff and students
• CPNI
Think securely about your business: Supporting business leaders to operate securely
with overseas parties available at:
www.cpni.gov.uk/secure-business
• CPNI
Trusted Research: Countries and Conferences available at:
www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/Countries%20and%20Conferences%20Guide.pdf
• Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO)
www.gov.uk/government/organisations/foreign-commonwealth-development-office
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3
PROTECTING YOUR 
CAMPUSES
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OVERVIEW
This chapter is intended to support your institution in protecting your campuses and the 
assets from security-related risks associated with potentially hostile activity. It focuses 
on cybersecurity, estates and visitors in the context of your institution’s international 
partnerships and collaborations. It is not intended to provide general advice on campus 
security or physical and personnel security in the context of a wider range of threats, such 
as terrorist threats, and you should seek other resources for guidance on such matters.
Senior leaders must work together to protect UK campuses against security-related risks 
through a whole-organisation approach that ensures staff, students and visitors are aware 
of their responsibilities to protect digital and physical infrastructure and assets, including 
research, property and data.
This chapter includes a list of resources available from CPNI and NCSC and others.
3.1: Cybersecurity, estates and visitors
The UK’s higher education institutions are proudly dynamic, diverse and international, 
bringing together staff, students and visitors from across the globe throughout the year. 
Open access to campuses and their associated sites is an important aspect of academic 
life that is necessarily built on a foundation of secure cyber networks, physical assets and 
campus buildings.
The threat to universities ranges from premeditated, sophisticated attacks on digital 
networks to more opportunistic breaches that exploit complacency and low cybersecurity 
awareness among individuals. The consequences of such breaches are not limited to your 
institution and may threaten the security and prosperity of the UK. 
Develop and implement cybersecurity strategies 
Senior leaders should ensure that cybersecurity strategies are developed and implemented. 
In parallel, institutions should develop effective oversight and reporting protocols for 
cybersecurity risks, including threat modelling and intelligence-sharing with government 
and the sector via mechanisms such as the Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership 
(CiSP; see ‘Additional resources’ below). 
Your institution will have a range of cybersecurity policies and procedures to manage access 
to software and hardware. However, as partnerships and collaborations come under greater 
scrutiny, it is likely that the frequency and sophistication of cyber-attacks will increase. You 
should ensure that your institution:
• uses published threat assessments to anticipate likely cyber-threats, such as the weekly 
threat assessments published by the NCSC 
• understands and implements NCSC’s 10 steps to cybersecurity
• considers certification through the NCSC Cyber Essentials scheme.
You should pay particular attention to protecting information of specific value, which is 
likely to be subject to greater risk. This might include, for example, research with potential 
economic value, politically and commercially sensitive material, sensitive enterprise data  
or data on your staff and students.
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You should regularly review your cybersecurity risk response processes and, if possible, 
share your findings with other institutions and the government where this would support 
the sector to better respond to future incidents. In addition to developing an evidence-base, 
this exchange of information will increase the collective capacity of institutions, the sector 
and government to respond.
Appropriate training is particularly important for researchers working on high-security 
issues, controlled technologies or other areas of research that are subject to export control 
legislation. Institutions should develop policies and training packages that highlight the 
need to segregate research materials and limit and monitor access to sensitive data and 
information. Such policies include:
• segregation of sensitive research – separate out different areas of research so that data 
and information is not all held in one place, both physically and online 
• access control – only users and partners with a valid requirement have access to this 
data and networks, with two-step identity verification where possible 
• security of IT platforms – institutions should develop policies to ensure that staff and 
students understand the security of any collaborative IT platforms, especially those used 
by third parties 
• protection from extraterritorial jurisdiction issues – consider carefully the risks faced 
by academics and students participating in online discussions about issues that some 
nation states might regard as sensitive and take steps to inform these individuals. 
To support decision-makers, Jisc and UUK will issue an update of the 2013 guidance Cyber 
security and universities: managing the risk. This section will be updated with once the 
updated guidance is available.
Develop integrated estates and visitor policies
You should embed awareness of security-related issues into your existing estates and visitor 
policies. There needs to be robust policies and procedures for visitors to your institution, 
covering both staff and students.
As the case studies on loss of data (see Section 2.2) demonstrate, both digital and physical 
infrastructure are vulnerable to security infringements. All institutional policies and 
frameworks to protect campus infrastructure should cover particular physical security risks. 
In relation to campus visitors, these policies might include:
• frameworks, policies and risk assessments that clearly distinguish between different 
types of visitor (for example, between professional and academic staff, undergraduate 
and postgraduate students, and short- and long-stay visitors) 
• adequate checks on visitors before, on arrival and during their stay to restricted areas of 
the campus, including identity checks and checks on compliance with visa requirements, 
and checks to ensure their access is limited to the approved duration of their visit
• senior oversight and accountability for any visitor and visa agreements 
• restrictions on access for visitors to courses or projects not cleared via their visa or ATAS 
application and clear processes for oversight and accountability for changing these 
during their visit
• clear advice, information and guidance for visitors and staff to inform them of the need 
to adhere to appropriate protocols during their time on campus.
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Institutions will need to exercise their judgement as to how policies are designed and 
implemented. It is likely that the level of access to your campus will vary, depending on the 
type of activity being undertaken.
Annex 2 to these guidelines contains a series of guiding questions that might support 
institutions to develop strategies in response to the issues set out in this section.
Case study: Staff visitors
The case studies in these guidelines are hypothetical, and they are intended to support the 
user to apply these guidelines in practice.
Scenario
An international graduate research student based in the UK maintained connections with 
a research group at a university in their home country. The student sought permission to 
deliver a more formal partnership between the two research labs and offered to facilitate 
this. At the time, the research was not subject to export controls and, due to its initial  
small scale, the new partnership was exempt from sophisticated internal due diligence  
and oversight.
Following the establishment of the partnership, the student invited colleagues from the 
international lab to visit the UK institution, and made travel and other arrangements,  
and assisted with interpretation during their stay. 
About a year into the partnership, a UK research supervisor became concerned that the 
relationship was very one-sided. Despite the overseas lab being extremely well-funded,  
it was slow to follow up on emerging research and technology. 
Following a reassessment of the relationship, the supervisor realised that the research 
would likely become subject to export control restrictions and so terminated the 
partnership. 
UK university staff later discovered that, during their visit, the delegation had taken 
detailed photographs of lab equipment for the purposes of reproducing the lab at their 
home institution. Inadequate supervision meant this breach was not identified at the  
time and the relationship was allowed to continue.
Lessons learned
• Overseas partners may attempt to access the early-stage development of technology  
and research before it is subject to export control legislation. 
• Robust due diligence is necessary for all international partnerships, and may involve 
further investigation of the proposed partner and their identifiable associations to 
establish the size and scale of their operations.
• There is a need for strict protocols for all visiting staff and students, conducted prior to 
campus visits and tours. 
• Visa invitation letters should only be authorised by suitably senior members of staff,  
not students.
As an exporter, you need to comply with strategic export controls and ensure that without 
an appropriate export licence is in place, where this is necessary. It is also possible that 
a compliance inspector from the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) will identify an 
irregularity during a compliance audit.
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If this happens, it is very important to report the irregularity (sometimes known as 
‘voluntary disclosure’) to HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) as soon as possible, as they are 
responsible for the enforcement of strategic export controls. If the irregularity was found on 
an ECJU-compliance audit, the compliance inspector will have informed HMRC and you 
are strongly advised to do the same. 
This information, as well as contact details for HMRC and the ECJU Joint Unit, can be 
found on www.gov.uk 
Case study: Student visitors
The case studies in these guidelines are hypothetical, and they are intended to support the 
user to apply these guidelines in practice.
Scenario
Following an agreement between their two institutions, a cohort of overseas Master’s 
students spent six months at a UK university. The students were expected to attend classes 
on campus and were assigned academic supervisors.
Although financial checks were completed before the agreement was finalised, further  
due diligence was not. Specific checks were not conducted to ensure compliance with  
UK strategic export controls. Supervisors had minimal interactions with the students, 
assuming the visit co-ordinator to be in regular contact with them. This left the students 
unsupervised and free to approach researchers and ask to collaborate with them, as is 
normal academic practice. 
Following multiple approaches, several students became involved in highly sensitive, 
export-controlled research projects and gained access to restricted facilities. A request for 
access to a computing facility was granted by the co-ordinator with no additional oversight. 
The students shared the single-access card to visit the lab and other controlled areas. 
Lessons learned
• The university should have conducted a review of the work being undertaken. If the 
technology was controlled, an export licence should have been requested.
• A range of techniques can be used to identify and exploit vulnerabilities at UK higher 
education institutions. 
• Locations containing sensitive research and materials must be appropriately protected. 
Following this breach, the card-operated door was replaced with turnstiles, to prevent 
multiple entries with a single card. 
• Clear management and oversight processes are required for visiting students and staff, 
including pre-arrival checks and regular points of contact. Supervisors of visiting staff 
must be aware of their obligations and responsibilities for the entirety of the visit.  
• Staff working on export control or dual-use technologies must understand and fulfil 
their obligations to protect their research and university IP, both at home and abroad.
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Additional resources on cybersecurity
• CPNI  
Think before you Link available at:  
www.cpni.gov.uk/security-campaigns/think-you-link
• CPNI  
Trusted Research: Guidance for Academia available at:  
www.cpni.gov.uk/trusted-research-guidance-academia
• Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership (CiSP)  
www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/keep-up-to-date/cisp
• NCSC  
Cyber Essentials Certification Scheme available at:  
www.ncsc.gov.uk/cyberessentials/overview
• NCSC  
Risk management guidance available at:  
www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/risk-management-collection
• NCSC Weekly threat reports  
www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/keep-up-to-date/threat-reports?q=&defaultTypes=report&sor
t=date%2Bdesc&start=0&rows=20
• NCSC  
Zero trust architecture design principles available at:  
www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/zero-trust-architecture-design-principles
• South, M (2018)  
Scaling a governance, risk, and compliance program for the cloud, emerging 
technologies, and innovation Amazon Web Services (AWS) available at: 
https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/scaling-a-governance-risk-and-compliance-
program-for-the-cloud/
• UCISA Information Security Management Toolkit available at:   
www.ucisa.ac.uk/ismt
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4
PROTECTING  
YOUR  
PARTNERSHIPS
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OVERVIEW
This chapter is intended to support your institution to protect international partnerships. It 
is divided into two sections. The first considers the steps that universities need to undertake 
to safeguard research partnerships, with reference to the relevant legislation. The second 
considers how universities might safeguard transnational education partnerships.
The case studies exemplify the type of expected challenges and the practical actions that 
will protect intellectual property (IP), research integrity and compliance with relevant 
legislation, at all stages of the research cycle.  
Senior leaders should take measures to ensure that research staff and students understand 
and adhere to processes that safeguard IP during international partnerships, comply 
with export control legislation and promote the ethics and integrity of research and data 
management. 
4.1: Research security, intellectual property and export control compliance
The UK’s world-leading research is increasingly open and collaborative. This presents 
significant and exciting opportunities, but also challenges. UK higher education institutions 
are subject to regular and targeted attempts by individuals and organisations from overseas 
seeking to improperly gain access to research and IP.
To assist institutions in making informed decisions about international partnerships and 
to protect their researchers and academic values, NCSC and CPNI developed Trusted 
Research.8 This offers guidance of particular relevance to research in STEM subjects, dual-
use technologies, emerging technologies and commercially sensitive research areas.
NCSC has also produced Trusted Research: Guidance for Senior Leaders, which outlines the 
essential considerations for you. You are strongly advised to familiarise yourself with these 
materials (see ‘Additional resources’ below for details.)
Key security threats and challenges that the research community should seek to manage 
and mitigate include: 
• inadequate due diligence on international research partnerships, including those not 
part of formal, funded research projects 
• inadequate oversight and monitoring of research partnerships and processes 
• failure to adequately protect IP at the contractual stage and throughout the research 
partnership through IP ‘leakage’ 
• IP theft by hostile actors, including through cyber-attacks and in-person theft  
of property 
• non-compliance with export controls and dual-use technology legal frameworks.
8  www.cpni.gov.uk/trusted-research
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Conduct due diligence on all international research partnerships 
Section 1.2 above sets out the overarching principles for due diligence on overseas 
partnerships. With respect to research collaboration, institutions must conduct due 
diligence proportionate to risk on all prospective overseas partners, for all types of 
engagement – formal partnerships and informal collaborations, funded and non-funded. In 
sensitive areas of research, including those covered by export controls, this will necessarily 
include any correspondence and/or discussion about the research, even if this is ad hoc or 
informal. In some cases, these processes will be audited by funding organisations, such as 
United Kingdom Research and Innovation (UKRI).
Implement policies and contractual agreements to protect intellectual property
The theft or misappropriation of research and IP can occur at any stage of the research 
cycle. Tools and frameworks exist to protect against this, including the Trusted Research 
guidance referred to previously (see ‘Additional resources’ below). The guidance is designed 
to give researchers, UK universities and industry partners confidence in international 
engagement, and to protect research and staff from potential theft, misuse or exploitation. 
Your institution must have external work and conflict of interest policies to ensure that all 
staff, including honorary staff and both UK and non-UK nationals, declare any conflicts of 
interest or other professional obligations, relevant affiliations or legal contracts that are not 
part of their direct employment with the institution.
Ensure compliance with export control legislation 
Researchers and research staff must be aware of the legal and regulatory frameworks 
relating to controlled technologies. Two prominent examples are export controls and the 
Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS).
UK strategic export controls are intended to restrict the export and transfer of sensitive 
technology, information or strategic goods, with the aim of preventing the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the illicit transfer of military technology and 
international threats such as terrorism (DfIT & ECJU, 2013). It is your responsibility to 
understand how export controls may apply to research or other activity conducted at your 
institution. Failure to comply with export control legislation is a criminal offence and may 
result in serious legal consequences. 
The key point is that the terms ‘technology’ and ‘information’ have much broader 
definitions in legislation than might ordinarily or commonly be understood (see  
also Glossary). 
To maximise compliance with export control legislation, individuals should: 
• consider potential end-use possibilities of technology: it is the duty of researchers and
their institutions to monitor potential end-uses of research, throughout the research life
cycle. In some cases, research will have enduse applications that are unidentifiable in the
early stages of development and continued monitoring is required
• inform researchers about the implications of intangible technology transfer: researchers
must be aware that controlled sensitive information transmitted electronically (eg via
social media, fax and email, videoconferencing, sharing screens remotely) and verbally
(eg in telephone and face-to-face discussions) may still be subject to export controls.
Further details can be found in DfIT & ECJU (2013).
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ATAS requires all international students who are subject to UK immigration control and 
intend to study at postgraduate level in certain sensitive subjects to apply for an ATAS 
certificate. Applications must be made before an individual starts study in the UK or before 
being given access to university systems. Sensitive subjects include those that could be 
used in programmes to develop WMDs or their means of delivery. ATAS is operated by the 
Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and applies to all students whose 
nationality is outside the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland, irrespective 
of the country of residence at the point of application. Further information on the ATAS 
scheme can be found on the FCDO website (see ‘Additional resources’ below). 
Annex 3 of these guidelines contains checklists that will support your institution to manage 
challenges related to research security.
Case study: Overseas government contracts and appointments
The case studies in these guidelines are hypothetical, and they are intended to support the 
user to apply these guidelines in practice.
Following a recruitment process, an international professor was appointed to a UK 
university. Unknown and undisclosed to the university, the professor maintained paid 
involvement in a number of overseas government projects, including leading a national 
laboratory for applied military research. To progress this work without regular travel, 
the professor hosted fully funded visiting research students from his overseas laboratory 
to research in the UK. These students were used to transfer dual-use research and 
technologies to the overseas lab. 
The scenario
Colleagues became concerned at the professor’s workload and ill-health. Following an 
approach from university staff, the professor confessed to holding an external position 
and operating a shadow laboratory. The professor explained that the overseas contract 
placed him in a legally and ethically compromising position, prevented disclosure of the 
relationship without consent from the overseas government employer, and required him 
to work for many additional months a year. In addition, he had been instructed to curtail 
his UK employment in the next year and return to the home country and laboratory, in 
line with the existing contractual agreement. The majority of the funded visiting graduate 
research students, it transpired, were directly linked to the overseas country’s military 
development activities.
Lessons learned
• Academic staff and students are sometimes recruited to circumvent export control
regulations and transfer technology without authorisation.
• Although the institution had policies in place to identify overseas appointments and
conflicts of interest, these procedures were not suitably robust. Institutions should
promote a culture of vigilance, risk minimisation and support to identify vulnerabilities,
particularly in relation to high-risk research areas.
• University policies must require all staff to disclose all overseas appointments,
consultancies or honorary positions held. Universities must take a proactive approach
to confirming guest academics’ curricula vitae to ensure independent academic research
is safeguarded.
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Additional resources on research security, IP and export controls
Export control legislation 
• DfIT & ECJU (forthcoming)
Guidance for academics on export control legislation available at:
These guidelines will be updated once the guidance is published.
• DfIT & ECJU (2020)
Export controls: dual-use items, software and technology, goods for torture and
radioactive sources available at:
www.gov.uk/guidance/export-controls-dual-use-items-software-and-technology-goods-
for-torture-and-radioactive-sources
• DfIT & ECJU (2013)
Do I need an export licence? available at:
www.gov.uk/guidance/beginners-guide-to-export-controls
(due to be updated December 2020)
• FCDO
Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) available at:
www.gov.uk/guidance/academic-technology-approval-scheme
Intellectual property
• Intellectual Property Office (2016)
IP protection abroad: country guides available at:
www.gov.uk/government/collections/ip-protection-abroad-country-guides
• Intellectual Property Office (2014)
Intellectual asset management for universities available at:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/308072/ipasset-management.pdf
4.2: Transnational education partnerships
UK universities hold a reputation as world leaders in transnational education (TNE).  
UK institutions have nearly 700,000 students registered on UK programmes overseas, and 
the International Education Strategy (DfE & DfIT, 2019) sets an ambition to support the 
growth of this activity. Such activity brings significant opportunities for institutions, but 
also presents a wide range of risks that you should be aware of.
The risks associated with TNE go beyond financial and reputational concerns. When  
UK providers enter into TNE arrangements, they are subject to local regulations and  
must comply with instructions from local authorities. TNE operations may be at greater  
risk of security-related issues. A key issue for universities is to ensure that the core values 
of their institutions can be safeguarded in the context of local requirements. Universities 
may face a choice between complying with overseas government requirements or 
discontinuing activity. 
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Many universities have made significant progress in managing risks, having adopted 
integrated management models that enable them to assess, rank and mitigate risks across 
locations. However, these systems sometimes fail to integrate the risks affecting partner 
organisations overseas, in treating them as external. Sound risk-mitigation policies should 
acknowledge and assess the existence of risks that may affect overseas partners differently, 
and as far as possible, develop frameworks to co-own residual risk with transnational 
partners overseas.
Ensure thorough and regular due diligence on overseas partners
Different TNE activities carry different levels of risk. A branch campus with research-
active staff can be more exposed to host government policy towards higher education 
than a partnership to validate a programme taught by a foreign provider. Senior leaders 
developing risk mitigation strategies within their due diligence process should:
• consider the level of exposure of their staff, students, research, IP and other resources
to interference in the light of the specific TNE arrangements (e.g. subjects taught and
related factors)
• draw on information from a diverse range of sources and use it to get a holistic
understanding of the potential risks of operating overseas (e.g. through the FCDO,
relevant UK embassy or consulate, the British Council, British Chamber of Commerce
overseas and trusted partners)
• ensure that the TNE partner overseas has academic and institutional aims and objectives
that are compatible with those of the UK institution
• understand the research partnerships and relationships of international institutions in
their country of origin: for example, does the partner have links to governments and/or
military research organisations?
• develop a framework and governance covering what research can be undertaken and
what relationships they can engage in.
Include risks to institutional autonomy and academic freedom in risk registers and 
statements
Risks affecting institutional autonomy and different approaches to the relationship between 
the state and higher education providers have the potential to threaten the core values of 
UK higher education, particularly through infringement of academic freedom. Institutions 
should ensure that:
• risks related to institutional autonomy or academic freedom overseas are included in
risk registers and risk statements, and are appropriately monitored, with oversight from
the governing body
• the relationship of prospective and existing partners with government authorities in the
overseas country is well understood, including the degree of autonomy, independence
and transparency in the relationship.
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Senior leaders with oversight of TNE activities have the responsibility to understand local 
values, laws, practices and expectations while developing policies and procedures to protect 
the values of UK higher education in an overseas context. These considerations should 
relate to institutional autonomy and to the relationship between the State and higher 
education providers. For example, in many places universities are public institutions with 
staff who are appointed by government and who are effectively civil servants. This should 
not in itself present a barrier to collaboration or partnership, but institutions have to 
consider whether this relationship presents a risk.
Senior leaders should remain open and transparent towards the tensions and conflicts 
associated with TNE operations based in foreign jurisdictions, while also seeking to manage 
trade-offs in a mutually respectful way.
Maintain a balance between robust centralised risk management and sufficient 
local autonomy
The majority of TNE ventures are built in partnership with overseas stakeholders. Often 
this is a requirement placed by local authorities and regulators, which occasionally become 
a formal partner in TNE operations. Institutions should ensure these partnerships maintain 
a balance between robust centralised risk management and sufficient local autonomy. 
Senior leaders should: 
• consider how relevant policies and procedures compare with those used by partner
institutions overseas, while embedding robust governance structures to raise and solve
any issues that arise early on
• embed security-related risks in their risk management frameworks, including
governance processes, risk policies, risk registers in the UK and overseas, assurance and
audit processes, and business continuity planning in response to emergencies
• ensure that the interests of staff and students employed by or registered at the UK
university and based overseas are appropriately safeguarded (eg for students registered
at English providers through the University’s Student Protection Plan)
• ensure that appropriate secure access processes and procedures, including to intangible
assets, are in place, are appropriate to the sensitivity of the resources, and maintaining
central oversight of who has access to those resources
• ensure that relevant and appropriate measures are taken to keep any cyber networks
secure, as outlined in CPNI materials (see References for further information).
Jointly establish clear reporting lines and safe spaces for communication with 
local stakeholders
The most successful TNE partnerships combine mutual trust with robust oversight 
mechanisms. Not only are local partners best placed to identify and act on regulatory, 
economic or social changes affecting TNE, but often have the authority to perform certain 
legal acts that are essential for the educational operations of the UK university in the 
territories where it operates. 
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Gaining and retaining the trust of overseas stakeholders (students and their families, staff, 
partner providers, local authorities and regulators) is crucial for universities to be able to 
identify, manage and mitigate risk in TNE operations. Jointly established clear reporting 
lines and safe spaces for communication (including whistleblowing policies) applicable to 
overseas operations can favour early detection of security-related risks. However, note that 
joint risk assessments are rare, even though local partners are often more exposed. Senior 
leaders should: 
• map out key actors with a stake in the education partnership, which may include  
local providers, authorities, businesses and employers, trade unions,  
non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations, UK embassies  
or consulates and professional bodies  
• be aware of power dynamics and imbalances that may affect their relationship with local 
stakeholders, and between local stakeholders themselves
• where possible, assess vulnerabilities in the organisational and financial structure of  
the local partners, which may increase the risk of transmission of interference
• ensure support mechanisms are in place that help local stakeholders build and  
co-own risk management systems, especially those related to fraud, IP theft and  
corrupt practices
• establish appropriate communication channels (including whistleblowing policies) to 
allow local partners to raise concerns with the appropriate level of confidentiality and 
data and identity security. 
Develop an exit strategy supported by comprehensive, rules-based arrangements and 
high-level principles
TNE partnerships evolve over time, and your institution should regularly review its scope.  
It is important to have an exit strategy in place if partnerships need to be ended. This 
strategy should be supported by high-level principles that have been communicated to  
all TNE partners, as well as comprehensive, rules-based arrangements that address issues 
such as academic freedom, IP and assets. Senior leaders should:
• clearly define a set of high-level principles that have been communicated to the  
TNE partner(s)
• follow rules-based arrangements that add protection to important issues such as 
academic freedom, IP, assets and staffing arrangements
• ensure students are protected in the event of partnership arrangements being 
terminated, through appropriate transition or other arrangements.
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FORWARD LOOK
The UK has, and continues to benefit economically, socially and culturally from the 
internationalisation of the higher education sector. International collaborations and 
partnerships continue to drive the success of the sector. The higher education sector, 
working with the UK government, wishes to build on that success, cementing the role of 
UK universities as world leaders in education and research.
The UK government has published ambitious strategies for international education 
and international research, in the form of the International Education Strategy (DfE & 
DfIT, 2019) and the UK Research and Development Roadmap (HM Government, 2020). 
The strategy and the roadmap envisage an increase in activity, both in the volume and 
value of education exports, and an increase in international research collaborations and 
partnerships. As those strategies acknowledge, that expansion cannot come at any cost, and 
these guidelines are part of a wider effort intended to ensure that the growth of such activity 
does not compromise the values of UK universities or the national interest.
The recommendations and changes envisaged in these guidelines will support institutions 
to protect their reputation and values, their staff, estates and partnerships. This will require 
changes in culture as well as policies and processes to ensure that individuals are well 
supported to make the right decisions.
Working with others, including the UK government, UUK’s efforts have been focused on 
securing changes in awareness and understanding within the higher education sector of 
security-related issues, including through the production of these guidelines. We remain 
committed to this work, and will undertake an evaluation of this guidance. We will publish 
an update on our progress in autumn 2021.
Sector bodies and professional membership bodies have a major role to play in driving 
this agenda forward. As part of the evaluation of this guidance, we will consider what 
other changes need to happen within the higher education sector to help individuals and 
universities manage security-related risks.
The UK government has a major role to play in supporting individuals and institutions in 
addressing the threats and mitigating the risks set out in these guidelines. We will continue 
to work with the government to ensure we have a clear, collaborative and constructive 
approach towards protecting and promoting growth in research and innovation activities, 
institutional autonomy, academic freedom and freedom of speech in the context of growing 
security challenges.
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GLOSSARY
academic freedom: while difficult to define precisely, academic freedom is generally 
recognised as the freedom of academics in the UK higher education sector to: teach and 
discuss; carry out research, publish the results and make them known; freely express 
opinions around the academic institution or system in which they work; participate 
in professional or representative academic bodies; not be censored; and fulfil their 
functions without discrimination or fear of repression.
The above is underpinned by the provisions of: the 1997 UNESCO Recommendation 
concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel (Section VI(A)); the 
Education Reform Act 1998 Section 202(2)(a); and the Higher Education and Research 
Act 2017 Section 2(8)(c).9
branch campus: an entity that is owned, at least in part, by a foreign education provider, 
that is operated in the name of the foreign education provider, and that provides an 
entire academic programme, substantially on site, leading to a degree awarded by the 
foreign education provider.
influence: all governments, including the UK government, try to influence deliberations 
on issues of importance to them. These activities, when conducted in an open and 
transparent manner, are a normal aspect of international relations and diplomacy and 
can contribute positively to public debate.
intangible asset: something valuable that is not material. The context of a higher 
education institution, intangible assets could include inventions, works of authorship, 
software, data, know-how, experimental designs, and technical information.
interference: malign activity by another state or those acting on its behalf that is designed 
to have a detrimental effect on the interests of the UK. This activity can be deceptive, 
coercive or corruptive, and is not limited to the covert domain. It includes the use of 
agents of influence, leverage of investments, financial inducement, disinformation and 
other cyber-activities.
internationalisation: a broad term as applied to higher education, but used in these 
guidelines, to describe the purposeful integration of international and intercultural 
dimensions into aspects of university activity.10
research integrity: while there is no universal definition of research integrity, the 
concordat to support the integrity of research identifies five core elements (under 
commitment 1). The Singapore Statement on Research Integrity (2010), provides a 
further definition. In addition, the UK Research Integrity Office has set out principles 
of research integrity in its Code of Practice (UKRIO, 2009).
security-related: an umbrella term that describes a broad range of issues and risks that 
are associated with internationalisation. ‘Security-related’ risks referred to in these 
guidelines can be broadly grouped into two categories: attempts by overseas/hostile/
external actors or those acting on their behalf to illegitimately acquire academic research 
and expertise; and/or interfere with academic discourse.
9  https://hrc.sas.ac.uk/sites/default/files/files/AFIWG/AFIWG%20-%20DRAFT%20MODEL%20CODE%20OF%20CONDUCT%20final.pdf
10 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-20877-0_5
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technology: under export controls, used to cover information in the form of ‘technical 
data’ and ‘technical assistance’ (see the academic guidance published by the Export 
Control Joint Unit for full details).
transnational education (TNE): all types of higher education study programmes, or 
different sets of courses of study or educational services, in which learners are located in 
a country that differs from the one where the awarding institution is based, e.g. branch 
campuses, fly-in faculty, and online and/or distance learning.
Managing risks in internationalisation 51
ANNEX 1: SUMMARY OF RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO INSTITUTIONS
1: Protecting your reputation and values
1.1: Building resilience to security-related issues 
• CPNI
Trusted Research: Guidance for senior leaders available at:
www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/Trusted%20Research%20Guidance%20for%20
Senior%20Leaders.pdf
1.2: Due diligence
• ARMA
Consolidated Approach to Assurance and Due Diligence project available at:
https://arma.ac.uk/first-output-from-the-consolidated-approach-to-assurance-and-
due-diligence-project/
• CPNI
Campaign implementation plan available at:
www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/Trusted%20Research%20Implementation%20Guide.pdf
• CPNI
Checklist: Evaluating research proposals available at:
www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/Trusted%20Research%20Checklist%20for%20
Academia.pdf
• CPNI
Trusted Research: Guidance for Academia available at:
www.cpni.gov.uk/trusted-research-guidance-academia
Sources to help identify international collaborations or partnerships that fall into the 
high-risk category:
• UN Sanctions List
• US export entity control list
• HM Treasury’s financial sanctions targets
• Country corruption index
• Human Freedom Index
• World Justice Project Rule of Law Index
Templates and frameworks for due diligence
• Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (country overviews and risk briefings) 
https://country.eiu.com/All
• FCDO & DfIT
Overseas business risks available at:
www.gov.uk/government/collections/overseas-business-risk
• Global Edge (sources of statistical information for countries worldwide) 
https://globaledge.msu.edu/global-insights/by/country
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1.3: Promoting the values of UK higher education
• EHRC  
Freedom of Expression: a guide for higher education providers and students’ unions in 
England and Wales available at:  
www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/freedom-of-expression-guide-for-
higher-education-providers-and-students-unions-england-and-wales.pdf
• Kinzelbach, Saliba, Spannagel & Quinn  
Free Universities: Putting the Academic Freedom Index Into Action available at:  
www.gppi.net/media/KinzelbachEtAl_2020_Free_Universities.pdf
• Scholars at Risk  
Values at Home and in Partnership available at:  
www.scholarsatrisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Values-at-Home-and-in-
Partnerships.pdf
• University of Chicago  
Foundational Principles available at:  
https://freeexpression.uchicago.edu/foundational-principles/
2: Protecting your people
2.1: Internal and external communications and knowledge-sharing 
• CPNI  
Developing a Security Culture available at:  
www.cpni.gov.uk/developing-security-culture
• CPNI  
Optimising People in Security available at:  
www.cpni.gov.uk/optimising-people-security
2.2: Protecting staff and students travelling and working overseas
• CPNI  
Think securely about your business: Supporting business leaders to operate securely 
with overseas parties available at:  
www.cpni.gov.uk/secure-business
• CPNI  
Trusted Research: Countries and Conferences available at:  
www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/Countries%20and%20Conferences%20Guide.pdf
• Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) 
www.gov.uk/government/organisations/foreign-commonwealth-office
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3: Protecting your campuses
3.1: Cybersecurity, estates and visitors 
• CPNI
Think before you Link available at:
www.cpni.gov.uk/security-campaigns/think-you-link
• CPNI
Trusted Research: Guidance for Academia available at:
www.cpni.gov.uk/trusted-research-guidance-academia
• Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership (CiSP)
www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/keep-up-to-date/cisp
• Gaehtgens, F, Data, A, Kelley, M (2009)
Remove Standing Privileges Through a Just-in-Time PAM Approach Gartner
Research available at:
www.gartner.com/en/documents/3957029/remove-standing-privileges-through-a-just-
in-time-pam-ap
• NCSC
Cyber Essentials Certification Scheme available at:
www.ncsc.gov.uk/cyberessentials/overview
• NCSC
Risk management guidance available at:
www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/risk-management-collection
• NCSC
Weekly threat reports
www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/keep-up-to-date/threat-reports?q=&defaultTypes=report&
sort=date%2Bdesc&start=0&rows=20
• NCSC
Zero trust architecture design principles available at:
www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/zero-trust-architecture-design-principles
• South, M (2018) Scaling a governance, risk, and compliance program for the cloud,
emerging technologies, and innovation Amazon Web Services (AWS) available at:
https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/scaling-a-governance-risk-and-compliance-
program-for-the-cloud/
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4: Protecting your partnerships
4.1: Research security, intellectual property and export control compliance
• DfIT & ECJU (2020)
Export controls: dual-use items, software and technology, goods for torture and
radioactive sources available at:
www.gov.uk/guidance/export-controls-dual-use-items-software-and-technology-goods-
for-torture-and-radioactive-sources
• DfIT & ECJU (2013)
Do I need an export licence? available at:
www.gov.uk/guidance/beginners-guide-to-export-controls
(due to be updated December 2020)
• FCDO Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) available at:
www.gov.uk/guidance/academic-technology-approval-scheme
• Intellectual Property Office (2016)
IP protection abroad: country guides available at:
www.gov.uk/government/collections/ip-protection-abroad-country-guides
• Intellectual Property Office (2014)
Intellectual asset management for universities available at:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/308072/ipasset-management.pdf
4.2: Transnational education partnerships
• DfE & DfIT (2019)
International Education Strategy: global potential, global growth available at:
www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-education-strategy-global-
potential-global-growth/international-education-strategy-global-potential-global-
growth
Managing risks in internationalisation 55
ANNEX 2:  
GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR CYBERSECURITY, ESTATES AND VISITOR POLICIES
1. Are security-related risks and overseas threats sufficiently embedded in cybersecurity 
strategies, estates policies and visitor procedures and protocols?
2. Is there sufficient join-up between those responsible for the oversight and discharge of 
strategies relating to the protection of campuses and infrastructure, whether through 
the protection of digital systems, physical property or visitor procedures and protocols? 
What mechanisms are in place to support this join-up?
3. Are periodic risk assessments performed to evaluate risk in each building, taking into 
consideration multiple factors such as the type of research activities taking place, 
including non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), the range of visitors and shipping to and 
from the building?
4. Are the risk assessments undertaken by personnel with expertise and responsibilities 
in the various areas of interest, including the protection of digital systems, physical 
property and visitor procedures and protocols? 
5. Are there effective procedures in place to review regularly access to sensitive data and 
facilities by those who have access?
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ANNEX 3:  
CHECKLISTS FOR RESEARCH SECURITY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
EXPORT CONTROLS
Research security checklists
Due diligence on international research partnerships
1. How clear are requirements to undertake proportionate risk assessments before
international research collaborations start?
2. Who has responsibility for conducting risk assessments on overseas research projects?
3. What policies exist in the university to identify research contracts that require additional
oversight due to the nature of the research and/or the type of partnership?
4. How does your institution investigate the size and type of research operations being
undertaken by a potential new research partner?
5. What are your institutional processes for monitoring small or informal research
partnerships that are established by individual academics or principal investigators?
6. What additional resources and support are available to provide ongoing due diligence on
high-risk international research partnerships?
7. Have you taken steps to ensure that any translated versions of contractual agreements
include identical terms and conditions?
Policies and contractual agreements to protect intellectual property
1. What policies, tools and frameworks does your institution use to protect intellectual
property (IP)?
2. Who has responsibility for signing off and monitoring contractual agreements on
research collaborations?
3. What is the process for contracts and agreements put in place for non-funded research
projects, such as one-to-one research collaborations between academics in the UK
and overseas?
4. What processes are in place to deal with breaches of, or changes to contractual
research agreements?
5. Are researchers – both those based in the UK and those based overseas – asked to
disclose external work obligations and conflicts of interest on a regular basis?
6. What kind of training is available to support researchers to take measures to protect
against IP theft or leveraged transfer through cybersecurity infringements or the theft of
personal property?
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Dual-use technologies and export control legislation
1. Do researchers understand the term ‘dual-use’ and know how it affects them?
2. How do researchers reasonably consider the potential for their research to become
dual-use?
3. In what ways might researchers consider the potential for their research to be used for
purposes that are inconsistent with promoting economic, social and security benefits for
the UK?
4. What strategies are in place to ensure compliance with export control legislation and
other relevant legislative frameworks? What guidance exists on when researchers should
seek further advice, internally or external to the university?
5. Is there a risk that investment might seek to or be able to undermine or circumnavigate
UK strategic export controls or similar measures?
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